The draft law on the formation of the General Inspectorate of Security Organs (GIBS) contains a clause limiting heads of state security organs, including the civilian intelligence agencies, to a maximum of two consecutive five-year periods at their posts. Currently the security chiefs’ mandates are unlimited. The draft law also extends to the fire service, customs and the prison Omissions mean the new law will do little to raise the standard of intelligence chiefs’ work, nor limit the potential corrupt practicesservice, but not the military police and military intelligence.
The proposal to limit the mandates of the domestic Security and Information Service (BIS) and the Office of Foreign Relations and Information (ÚZSI)—the Czech foreign espionage agency—does not, however, contain provisions aimed at ensuring departing intelligence chiefs do not take state secrets and other key information with them to new employers.
The draft law also doesn’t mention the issue of dismissing security and intelligence chiefs, leaving the matter to the provisions of the existing law on the conditions of service in the security bodies. This issue is nevertheless essential both to check that secret service chiefs properly fulfill their duties and as a counterweight to politicians' attempts to install associates and cronies.
These omissions mean the new law will do little to raise the standard and efficiency of the intelligence chiefs’ work, nor limit the potential for them becoming involved in corrupt practices.
Dealing with intelligence
With the possibility of being nominated to their posts for a further five years, the directors of the intelligence agencies, and also the other state security services, could easily succumb to temptation and do everything to be reappointed. The transition period between the first and second mandates will present a higher risk of leaks of sensitive information which the chiefs collected during their first mandates. For example, sensitive information on politicians who have a say on the nomination of the intelligence chiefs could be used to influence their choice of nominee.
Top intelligence agents can, for example, issue crucial security clearances which are essential for many top state jobs. Intelligence officials with whom Czech Position spoke—for obvious reasons they cannot be named—said that within the intelligence services there are stories with almost legendary status about politicians and lobbyists trying to arrange for security clearance for someone or other, or trying to block clearance for adversaries and their allies.
Then there’s the issue of collecting compromising materials, a practice which has played such a dominant role in Czech politics in recent years, and the procrastination of investigations involving the intelligence services into financial crimes which often involve corruption in high places.
How to control the chiefs?
A more effective way to attempt to eradicate the temptations for intelligence chiefs on the one side, and the politicians who nominate them on the other, would be to introduce seven-year mandates for the former. Why seven years? The period would be sufficient for The risk of out-going intelligence chiefs taking large amounts of classified information with them cannot be ignored. the chiefs to work effectively on projects and cases spanning several years and make key contributions to their outcome. At the same time, seven years should not be sufficient for chiefs to mould the agencies into their “own” empires.
A seven year period would also greatly reduce the odds of the nomination of new intelligence heads coinciding with the coming to power of a new government: it’s no secret that new leaderships do all in their powers to install “their” people to key positions in state agencies including the intelligence services.
The risk of out-going intelligence chiefs taking large amounts of classified information with them cannot be ignored and measures should be implemented to offer them fulfilling and meaningful work elsewhere in the state sphere. For example, when the former BIS director Karel Vulterin left the post eyebrows were raised when he found employment with a chain of casinos.
More recently, the former head of the police’s anti-corruption unit, Libor Vrba, entered the service of millionaire tycoon Tomáš Chrenek almost immediately after he handed in his badge and uniform. Then there was the scandal over former ÚZSI director, Karel Randák, being removed from his post during Miroslav Topolánek’s (Civic Democrat, ODS) government under suspicion of providing journalists with compromising materials.
During the debates on the draft GIBS bill, former ÚZSI director, former minister of interior, and chairman of the parliamentary defense and security, František Bublan (Social Democrats, ČSSD), suggested that practices in Canada and the UK could be considered in connection with the state security organs. In those countries judges are usually appointed as heads of the inspectorates of state organs and return to judicial duties when their mandates end.
How to fire?
No less important are the mechanisms for removing the heads of the state security organs. Experts from the intelligence community The directors of the security and intelligence organs are essentially appointed and removed according to the will of those who hold the reigns of executive power.and from the political sphere agree that the provisions contained in law no: 361/2003 defining the circumstances and conditions under which heads of the state security organs can be removed are insufficient.
At present the director of BIS, for example, is appointed and can be removed by the government with the agreement of the parliamentary defense and security committee, while the director of ÚZSI is appointed by the Minister of Interior with the agreement of the government, albeit according to an exhaustive list of conditions under which this can be done. While politicians would warmly welcome less stringent rules for removing the intelligence and security chiefs, legal experts say far more precisely defined conditions need to be introduced to limit the potential for political manipulation.
Nevertheless, no legislation can eliminate informal pressure as we witnessed this year with the removal of the previous President of Police, Oldřich Martinů. After several months of being “worked on” by politicians, he decided to hand in his resignation.
Previous practice indicates that the directors of the security and intelligence organs are essentially appointed and removed according to the will of those who hold the reigns of executive power. And it is not only because of this last circumstance that the Czech intelligence agencies would benefit from new legislation relating specifically to their functioning!
