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Czech presidential favorite Jan Fischer has legacy of inaction, dubious decisions

Evropa

  15:01

He’s the popular choice to replace Klaus in 2013, yet few know his opinions — or that his gov’t signed deals that cost the state dearly

Janu Fischerovi věří i bookmakeři sázkových kanceláří, kteří na jeho vítězství v prezidentských volbách vypsali nejnižší kurz. foto: © ČTKČeská pozice

Jan Fischer, a former interim prime minister and a current vice president of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), announced at the end of January that if direct presidential elections are held in 2013 he intends to stand as a nonaffiliated candidate. Recent opinion polls show Fischer is currently the clear favorite among Czech voters.

Political analysts say Fischer’s popularity is down to public perception of him as an honest person, untainted by the intrigues and internal machinations of party politics who meets expectations of what a nonaffiliated candidate should be like. Fischer himself has said he decided to consider standing in direct elections because of the large support he has among the Czech electorate. “I’m not someone who would run around Prague knocking on the doors of party secretaries,” Fischer said in an interview with Mladá fronta dnes, at the beginning of January.

Your tasks are ...

It is highly questionable whether Fischer’s popularity would be so high if he were a prime minister who oversaw the introduction of unpopular but necessary reformsOn handing over the reins of power following parliamentary elections in May 2010, Fischer spoke about the most pressing tasks which, he said, the incoming coalition government headed by Petr Nečas (Civic Democrats, ODS) needed to tackle: long-delayed reform of the pension system, reforms of taxation and the state administration, and development of science and education. One can only agree, but it is highly questionable whether Fischer’s popularity would be so high if he were a prime minister who oversaw the introduction of unpopular but necessary reforms in these areas.

During his stint as prime minister (April 2009 through July 2010), Jan Fischer did not launch any fundamental reforms. On the one hand, he did not have the strong support of a political party, but at the same time, to his advantage he did not have to settle in-party disputes and fractions.       
Fischer’s critics say that as caretaker prime minister he lacked initiative and name failure to act on the out-of-control state subsidization of photovoltaic farms as a prime example. Fischer, however, flatly rejects blame for failing to intervene to curtail the “solar boom” that cost the state dearly.     

But there are other key issues that Fischer appears to have left for the next government, perhaps the most obviously being the controversial eco-tender for the clear-up of environmental damage caused under the communist regime. The tender, which at least for now has been scrapped by the Nečas government, was set to be the most expensive public tender issued in the country’s post-communist history.

In April 2010, Czech Radio editor Petr Holub said on the program Opinions and Arguments that under Fischer’s government “the practice of over-priced transport infrastructure projects has culminated.” His cabinet approved an investment plan for motorways and main roads projects that included a universal rise in the cost per kilometer of road construction by about one third, reportedly without any explanation or justification for the price hike.

Holub also pointed to dubious military acquisitions and firms with hidden ownership structures winning tenders from the education ministry for projects financed with EU money when Fischer’s government was in power.  

25-year obligation

It appears that either the majority of voters do not know about the dubious decisions taken by Fischer’s government, or they have short memories, or they are simply more tolerant towards Fischer. In one area, however, Fischer’s government was uncharacteristically active. In May, 2010, the defense ministry — then headed by Martin Barták (ODS) — asked for a concessionary agreement for a public-private partnership (PPP) for the construction of new facilities at the Central Military Hospital (ÚVN) in Prague 6 which the ministry operates. On May 24, 2010, the cabinet agreed and three days later a contract was signed between the Prague Military Hospital Concession (PMHC) and the Central Military Hospital in Prague.

It transpired that the PMHC consortium’s offer was the only one to be considered. Under the original contract and consequent supplements and amendments, the PMHC was to receive over Kč 6.4 billion over 25 years for planning, building and operating a new ward and private accommodation, including a swimming pool, at the hospital. Under that contract, the hospital was to pay the private consortium around Kč 257 million a year.     

Initially, the contract set nine conditions to be fulfilled before it could take effect, though no time limit was set for fulfillment thereof. The permission simply allowed for either of the parties to withdraw from the contract if the conditions were not met. Under amendment no. 1, the deadline for the fulfillment of the conditions was set for mid-September 2010.

At the end of 2010, the extent of the project was revised and the sides undertook not to withdraw from the agreement before October 2011. However, this amendment signed on behalf of the state by Defense Minister Alexandr Vondra (ODS), contained a clause whereby the state would provide millions in compensation should it decide to withdraw from the contract.

The Supreme Audit Office (NKÚ) conducted a revue of the contract and concluded that the ministry’s commitment to provide compensation to the contractor in the event of project cancellation was unjustified. The parliamentary audit commission then reviewed the NKÚ’s findings:   

“The Central Military Hospital did not use the contractual option to withdraw from the contract, but to the contrary undertook to pay expenses to the contractual partner of up to Kč 217 million, but did not provide a reliable explanation for this course of action,” the committee concluded.

No comment

Fischer has never commented about the dubious Central Military Hospital contract and did not explain why his cabinet signed a contract involving a considerable amount of state funds so hastily.  

It appears that either the majority of voters do not know about the dubious decisions taken by Fischer’s government, or they have short memories, or they are simply more tolerant towards Fischer. But there’s another paradox. In various opinion polls people have expressed their support for Fischer without knowing his opinions. Practically the only thing Fischer has said about his intention to run for the presidency is that he wants to stand as a nonaffiliated candidate.

“I’m ready to formulate my opinions on foreign policy, the economy and reforms,” Fischer said in an interview on the news channel ČT 24 on January 7. But surely a candidate’s opinions on these policy areas should be the criteria according to which voters decide whom to vote for. Nevertheless, it appears that disillusioned by the state of Czech party politics, the majority of the Czech electorate are prepared to support a candidate simply because he doesn’t undertake unpopular measures and, moreover, he has a reputation as being “decent.”

The Senate, the upper house of the Czech parliament, is due to vote on direct presidential elections following the third and final reading of the appropriate bill on February 8. As a Constitutional law, the bill requires the support of a two-thirds majority in the chamber.

See related articles: 

Ex-Czech PM Fischer to run for presidency 
Would electing a Czech president directly be a fatal mistake? 
Czech citizens a major step closer to electing their own President